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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2013, North Carolina Superior Court Judge Robert 
Hobgood ruled unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the 
“Opportunity Scholarship Program” passed by the North Carolina 
General Assembly.1 The law would have funneled $10 million in 
taxpayer money to eligible families to help them pay for private 
school tuition.2 Judge Hobgood dismissed the general assembly’s 
efforts, stating that “[t]he General Assembly fail[ed] the children of 
North Carolina”3 because the law failed to provide “sound basic 
education” as constitutionally mandated by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina.4 Judge Hobgood added, “it appears to this court that 
the General Assembly is seeking to push at-risk students from low-
income families into non-public schools in order to avoid the cost of 
providing them a sound, basic education in public schools.”5 
The hostility towards the school voucher law expressed by Judge 
Hobgood characterizes a recent trend in North Carolina state and 
 
 1. Hart v. State, No. 13 CVS 16771, 2014 WL 6724598, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 
28, 2014) reversed by Hart v. State, No. 372A14, 2015 WL 4488553 (N.C. Sup. Ct. July 23, 
2015); see Sharon McCloskey & Lindsay Wagner, NC School Vouchers Ruled 
Unconstitutional, N.C. POL’Y WATCH (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2014/08/21/nc-school-vouchers-ruled-unconstitutional-
state-must-retrieve-distributed-funds/. 
 2. McCloskey & Wagner, supra note 1.  
 3. Transcript at 9, Hart v. State, 2014 WL 6724598 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2014) 
(No. 13 CVS 16771), available at http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/Judge% 
20Hobgood's%20Ruling%20granting%20Plts'%20MSJ%2008-21-14.pdf.  
 4. McCloskey & Wagner, supra note 1. Leandro v. State held that, while school 
districts do not have a constitutional right to equal funding, the North Carolina 
Constitution dictates that all children have a fundamental right to the opportunity to 
receive a sound basic education. 346 N.C. 336, 354, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (1997). 
 5. See Transcript, supra note 3, at 8; McCloskey & Wagner, supra note 1. 
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federal courts: teacher tenure,6 abortion restrictions,7 and rules to 
limit political protests8 are all examples of legislation passed by the 
North Carolina General Assembly only to be struck down by courts. 
This trend has not gone unnoticed by members of the general 
assembly. 
To combat this course of events, state legislators passed a law 
that changes the procedure for how constitutional challenges are 
heard in North Carolina.9 On August 7, 2014, Governor Pat McCrory 
signed into law a provision that requires all constitutional challenges 
to the facial validity of state laws to be heard in front of a three-judge 
court.10  
Supporters of the law laud the attempt of the general assembly to 
end plaintiff venue shopping, which state Senator Buck Newton said 
severely “undercuts the credibility and legitimacy of the judiciary.”11 
Others have been more critical of the general assembly’s action. In a 
statement to the Charlotte Observer, the former President of the 
North Carolina Bar Association Catharine Arrowood called the move 
“extremely disturbing.”12 To Arrowood and others who share her 
view, the general assembly’s move is not only unnecessary, but also 
impractical and inefficient.13 
North Carolina’s new law is unprecedented. No such law has 
ever been implemented by any other state.14 The law has provoked 
controversy and raised many questions. Among these questions, 
perhaps the most central is simply, is this a good idea? Any answer 
 
 6. Jane Stancill, Wake Judge Orders Halt to End of Teacher Tenure in NC, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 16, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/ 
education/article9122282.html. 
 7. Sandhya Somashekhar, N.C. Abortion Restriction Violates Free Speech, Judges 
Rule, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp 
/2014/12/22/n-c-abortion-restriction-violates-free-speech-judges-rule/. 
 8. See Anne Blythe, More ‘Moral Monday’ Cases Dismissed After US Supreme Court 
Ruling, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news 
/local/crime/article9150071.html. 
 9. See Craig Jarvis, G.O.P. Moves to Restrict Court Challenges of N.C. Laws, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local 
/article9152438.html. 
 10. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch. 
100, § 18B.16.(a), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 241 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (2014)); see Jarvis, supra note 9. 
 11. See Jarvis, supra note 9. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra Section I.A. While history shows that the federal courts used a three-
judge court to hear constitutional challenges, never before has such a model been 
implemented at the state court level. 
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requires an exploration of the constitutionality, practicality, and 
policy behind the creation of this three-judge court. This Comment 
begins such a discussion. In doing so, this Comment examines the 
constitutionality of North Carolina’s new law, and, while finding the 
three-judge court constitutionally acceptable, it argues that North 
Carolina should not have adopted this procedural mechanism. 
Drawing on lessons from the federal courts, this Comment contends 
that the use of such a panel should be abandoned because it will cause 
more problems than it solves. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the origins and 
evolution of the three-judge court in the federal judicial system, 
highlighting the reasons for its creation and its demise. Part II 
introduces and explains the law creating the three judge-court passed 
by the North Carolina General Assembly. Part III then addresses the 
constitutionality of the law, finding that a challenge to the law will 
likely fail, as precedent forecloses constitutional challenges. Finally, 
Part IV analyzes the normative concerns raised by the new legislation 
and calls for its abandonment by suggesting that the law is impractical 
and unneeded. In doing so, it will argue that the use of a three-judge 
court to hear constitutional challenges is unfair and inefficient and 
that it unnecessarily politicizes the state judiciary. The piece 
concludes by recommending revised statutory language that will 
make the law more palatable to all citizens in the event that the 
general assembly does not heed the call to abolish these courts. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND USE OF THREE-JUDGE COURTS IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The History of the Federal Three-Judge Court 
While this Comment focuses on the legal and policy concerns 
surrounding North Carolina’s creation of a three-judge court to hear 
constitutional challenges, a background on the federal history of these 
panels is needed. Providing a background on the history of the three-
judge courts in the federal court system will contextualize the general 
assembly’s recent actions and offer useful insights for the analysis of 
the current legislation.15 
 
 15. See infra Parts III–IV. 
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1.  “The Muted Fury of Congress”:16 The Beginnings of the Federal 
Three-Judge Courts 
a. The History of Ex parte Young 
The genesis of the three-judge court begins in 1908 with the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Ex parte Young.17 The time 
period surrounding the case was characterized by “vigorous social, 
political, and economic expansion.”18 This growth, however, brought 
new concerns. Massive industrial expansion led states to feel 
increasingly pinched by the demands of big businesses.19 In response, 
states implemented “novel regulatory and tax measures” in hopes of 
“cop[ing] with the needs of the new industrial world.”20 These 
regulatory measures proved ineffective because they were stymied by 
the private sector’s most powerful and lethal weapon: federal 
injunctions.21 
The growing tension between the states and the federal courts 
reached a fever pitch in 1908 when the Supreme Court decided Ex 
parte Young. Two years before the decision, the state of Minnesota 
enacted regulatory measures to reduce and fix railroad rates for both 
passengers and freight.22 Railroad companies attacked the law on Due 
 
 16. WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR 
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 (1994). 
 17. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 18. Elliott S. Marks & Alan H. Schoem, The Applicability of Three-Judge Courts in 
Contemporary Law: A Viable Legal Procedure or a Legal Horsecart in a Jet Age?, 21 AM. 
U. L. REV. 417, 419 (1972). Before 1900, courts had, on occasion, used multiple judges to 
decide cases, as the first promulgation of such three-judge courts was in 1789, but instances 
such as these were the exceptions to the use of a single judge. See David P. Currie, The 
Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1964). 
 19. Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 419. 
 20. Currie, supra note 18, at 5. Such measures included taxing, regulating working 
conditions, and establishing public-utility commissions to set freight and passenger rates 
on railroads. Id. 
 21. During this time period, federal judges repeatedly enjoined state officers from 
enforcing regulatory measures, finding that regulations violated due process. Id. Such 
injunctions were harmful to states because they paralyzed efforts by the states to protect 
themselves from the damaging actions of a business until a final decision was rendered. 
See id. at 6. Resentment and anger arose toward federal judges as these “stubborn 
obstacles” continuously blocked the exercise of state regulatory power. See id. at 5; see 
also Philip L. Merkel, The Origins of an Expanded Federal Court Jurisdiction: Railroad 
Development and the Ascendancy of the Federal Judiciary, 58 BUS. HIST. REV. 336, 336–37 
(1984) (discussing the rapid expansion of federal judicial power in the late 1800s and the 
“suspicion and contempt” many people felt toward the federal courts as a result). 
 22. James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a Remedy, There’s a 
Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 222 (2004). The 
statute levied heavy fines and carried the possibility of prison sentences for any railroad 
company that violated the law. Id. at 223. 
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Process and Commerce Clause grounds, arguing that the rates 
imposed by Minnesota were unconstitutionally confiscatory.23 The 
district court issued a preliminary injunction against Minnesota 
Attorney General Edward Young prohibiting the enforcement of the 
regulations.24 Young, however, defied the command and issued a 
petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the Northern Pacific 
Railway Company to abide by the newly enacted freight laws.25 
Young was then held in contempt of court and later challenged the 
contempt order to the Supreme Court though a writ of habeas 
corpus.26 
Although unconventional in his approach, Young’s argument 
that he could enforce Minnesota’s legislation seemed to rest firmly 
upon Supreme Court precedent.27 The Court had recently held in Fitts 
v. McGhee28 that the Eleventh Amendment prevented individuals 
from suing state officers for injunctive relief when those offenses were 
not directly authorized to enforce allegedly offensive state 
legislation.29 As it was, Minnesota’s legislature had drafted the 
regulatory measures in such a way as to avoid charging any particular 
state official with the specific duty of enforcing the law.30 Thus, Young 
argued that the railroad’s suit against him was, in effect, against the 
state of Minnesota, which should guarantee him immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment.31 Young’s argument, however, failed to 
 
 23. See Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young and the Fate of the Three-
Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 106–07 (2008). 
 24. Id. at 107. 
 25. Leonard, supra note 22, at 223–24. 
 26. Id. at 224. 
 27. See infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 28. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899). 
 29. Id. at 530. Such suits were suits against the state, over which federal circuit courts 
had no jurisdiction. A year before, the Supreme Court decided Smyth v. Ames. There, the 
court held that actions enjoining state officials from enforcing allegedly unconstitutional 
laws were not foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment if the state officials were actually 
charged with enforcing the law. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518–19 (1898); Solimine, 
supra note 23, at 106. 
 30. Solimine, supra note 23, at 107. 
 31. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 132. This Comment examines Ex parte Young within 
a very narrow frame, one that uses the case as a vehicle to explore the broader 
congressional reaction to the decision and the creation and implementation of the three-
judge court. Though a full doctrinal discussion of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, in any effort to describe Young’s context, reference to 
jurisprudence cannot be avoided in its entirety. For a full discussion of Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, see generally Leonard, supra note 22 (analyzing Ex parte 
Young in light of extensive historical background); JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER 
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987) 
(detailing the history of the Amendment over the last two centuries). 
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persuade the Court. Justice Peckham wrote for the majority that a 
federal court could enjoin a state officer from enforcing an 
unconstitutional statute.32 Young lost his case, and the federal 
injunction rendered impotent another state regulation. The response 
to Ex parte Young led to the creation of the three-judge court.33 
b. Reaction to the Decision 
Ex parte Young was not as revolutionary a case as congressional 
and public reaction may have supposed it to be. The decision did 
expand the Eleventh Amendment exceptions, but from a doctrinal 
perspective, Ex parte Young’s holding was not entirely disconnected 
from previous Supreme Court decisions.34 As one scholar noted: “[Ex 
parte Young] did not fundamentally alter the role of the federal courts 
so much as [it] gradually changed the labels under which litigants 
continued to do what they had done in the past.”35 Thus, 
understanding why the case created such a “storm of controversy”36 
requires looking to the perception of the case rather than its result. 
Ex parte Young ignited a tinderbox of outrage and resentment 
over the ever-increasing power of the federal judiciary. As alluded to 
above, the time period in which Ex parte Young was decided was a 
time of tension between the progressive ideals of many states and the 
conservative notions of economic regulation that pervaded the 
federal courts.37 This tension, coupled with the Supreme Court’s 
approval of a federal district court judge’s seemingly unbridled 
discretion to issue definite and absolute orders that outstripped the 
 
 32. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159. 
 33. See infra notes 34–51 and accompanying text. Scholars and later members of the 
Supreme Court have been critical of the court’s holding and rationale in Ex parte Young. 
See, e.g., Currie, supra note 18, at 4 (“Behind the outlandish justification concocted to 
support this holding lay the not implausible conviction that federal constitutional rights 
could not be adequately protected without the intervention of federal equity; therefore the 
philosophy of immunity had to yield.”). 
 34. Solimine, supra note 23, at 112. 
 35. Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled 
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 81 (1997); see also John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, 
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 962, 1032 n.325 (2002) (arguing that Ex parte Young was merely a gap-filler of 
sorts because the Court “closed a potential gap in the availability of relief, restoring 
traditional balance without having to repudiate or alter state sovereign immunity itself”). 
 36. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 465 (1974) (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., 
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 967 (2d ed. 
1973)). 
 37. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 112–13. 
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states’ regulatory power, became too much for many to overlook.38 
This sentiment was best characterized by Senator Lee Overman of 
North Carolina, paraphrasing Justice Harlan’s lone dissent in Ex 
Parte Young: “We have come to a sad day when one subordinate 
Federal judge can enjoin the officer of a sovereign State from 
proceeding to enforce the laws of the State passed by the legislature 
of his own State, and thereby suspending for a time the laws of the 
State.”39 
With the controversy now fully ablaze, the next two years of 
congressional debate sought to find a solution to “placate the state’s 
feelings of resentment and restore the dignity the states felt has been 
lost.”40 Much of the debate and discussion centered on ways to limit 
the breadth of power that the Supreme Court had vested in individual 
federal judges.41 Initially, some in Congress called for the complete 
abolition of federal injunctive power and put forward bills that would 
have forbid all federal injunctions against the enforcement of state 
laws.42 In support of such a measure, Senator Overman said, “If I had 
it in my power, I would not allow a federal court to enjoin the 
enforcement of a state statute.”43 But no matter how passionate many 
in Congress were over the federal judiciary’s supposed affront to state 
regulatory power, those like Senator Overman knew that in order to 
gain widespread support for reform, they would have to pull their 
punches and enact a more measured and temperate bill. 
Accordingly, in June of 1910, after years of vigorous debate,44 the 
Three-Judge Court Act was passed. Successfully attached as a rider to 
the Manns-Elkins Railroad Act, the 1910 bill forbid federal district 
court judges from issuing interlocutory injunctions against 
unconstitutional state statutes, unless such an injunction were granted 
by a district court comprised of a three-judge panel.45 While the 
Three-Judge Court Act did not possess the bite that many in 
 
 38. See id. Ex parte Young was decided in the same era as Lochner v. New York, a 
controversial decision striking down a state statute that regulated working conditions on 
due process grounds. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). Many contemporary 
observers of the Court saw the Young decision as indicative of the Court’s ongoing 
commitment to laissez faire economic principles. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 112. 
 39. 42 CONG. REC. 4847 (1908). 
 40. Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 420. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 45 CONG. REC. 7256 (1910). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Senator Overman first introduced a similar bill in 1908, but it died on the House 
floor after being passed in the Senate. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 115–16. 
 45. Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 218, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1910)) (repealed 1976). 
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Congress had called for, those who supported the bill nonetheless 
believed that the installation of a three-judge court would adequately 
shield the states from the power of the federal judiciary.46 An 
examination of the Senate debates at the time reveals this intent. For 
example, Senator Bacon of Georgia stated that “the purpose of the 
Bill is to throw additional safeguards around the enormous powers 
claimed for the subordinate Federal Court.”47 Later in the debate, 
Bacon revealed the fear that many members of Congress had of the 
federal judiciary and pointed to the potential role that the three-judge 
court could play in diminishing the court’s power: 
If these courts are to exercise the power of stopping the 
operation of the laws of a state, then at least let it be done on 
notice and not hastily, and let there be the judgment of three 
judges to decide such questions, and not permit such dangerous 
power to one man. The necessity for this legislation is a very 
grave one. It is a most serious trouble which now exists—that 
by the action of one judge the machinery of state laws can be 
arrested.48 
To men like Bacon and Overman, the three-judge courts would 
prevent abusive, imprudent exercises of judicial power. Short of 
taking away injunctive power altogether—the thought was—the 
three-judge courts afforded an adequate remedy. 
Proponents of the bill also sought to even the playing field 
between the states and the federal courts. The bill provided a direct 
right of appeal to the Supreme Court from any decision of the three-
judge court.49 The direct right of appeal sought to diminish the real 
sting that injunctions brought—the ability to stop enforcement of a 
state law until a final resolution.50 By providing a quick and timely 
appeal, the bill provided a further layer of protection in case of a 
panel’s adverse ruling. 
Regardless of the bill’s strength, the Three-Judge Court Act 
ushered in a new congressional disposition toward the federal 
courts.51 The three-judge district court was here to stay and played an 
 
 46. 42 CONG. REC. 4853 (1908). Congress’s “muted fury” as expressed in the Act can 
be explained by several factors, including congressional opposition to the three-judge 
court and uncertainty that such a court would effectively curtail abusive judicial power. 
ROSS, supra note 16, at 2. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 118. 
 47. 42 CONG. REC. 4853 (1908). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Mann-Elkins Act § 17. 
 50. See Currie, supra note 18, at 6. 
 51. See Solimine, supra note 23, at 152. 
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increasingly pivotal role in the federal court system throughout the 
next half-century. 
2.  Early Changes to the Three-Judge Court Act  
It did not take long for Congress to augment the power of the 
three-judge court. Initially, these changes were minor. In 1913, 
Congress amended the legislation to have a three-judge panel hear 
rulings on the constitutionality of state administrative commission 
orders.52 The 1913 amendment also provided that a three-judge 
district court must stay any federal court proceedings, if a state court 
had stayed proceedings under state law, pending adjudication of 
issues in state court. The 1913 Amendment, however, saw little use 
and was later deemed superfluous by the Supreme Court.53 
A more drastic change occurred in 1925. Previously, the three-
judge courts were restricted to cases where only temporary injunctive 
relief was sought, not permanent relief.54 This created the potential 
for conflicting results between the three-judge courts and the 
individual district court judges. Best stated, “[i]t is an anomaly to 
require the presence of a circuit judge and two district judges to hear 
an application for a preliminary injunction and then allow a single 
district judge to pass upon the cause finally.”55 Congress corrected the 
problem in 1925, adjusting the language of the Act to require three-
judge courts to convene for both permanent and interlocutory 
injunctions.56 
 
 52. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 160, § 266, 37 Stat. 1013 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
2281 (1948)) (repealed 1976).  
 53. See Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 292 (1923) (referring to the 
language of the 1913 Amendment as “superfluous” because “the original statute covered 
them”). 
 54. Mann-Elkins Act § 17; see also Solimine, supra note 23, at 123 (“[T]his distinction 
was anomalous, since the rationale for the existence of a three-judge district court did not 
sharply implicate different types of injunctive relief, and in theory, the one district judge 
might deny relief when the three judges earlier might have granted it.”). 
 55. 66 CONG. REC. 2917 (1925) (remarks of Sen. Albert Cummins). 
 56. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 238, 43 Stat. 936, 938 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. 1253 (1948). It should be noted that the 1925 amendment was passed as a part of 
the Judges’ Bill, which made the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction no longer 
mandatory, and replaced the appeal of right with the writ of certiorari. See Solimine, supra 
note 23, at 123. For a larger discussion of the history of the Judges’ Bill, see generally 
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the 
Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000) (tracing and analyzing the history of 
certiorari in the Supreme Court, with emphasis on the Judges’ Bill). 
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3.  FDR, Court Packing, and the Use of Three-Judge Courts for 
Constitutional Challenges 
The 1930s brought to the forefront a new use for the three-judge 
court: constitutional litigation. Throughout the decade, President 
Franklin Roosevelt found many pieces of New Deal legislation 
declared unconstitutional,57 such as the National Recovery 
Administration58 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.59 Mirroring 
the states’ resentment of the courts before Ex parte Young, Roosevelt 
and members of Congress grew increasingly irritated that a single 
federal judge could enjoin vital federal legislation.60 His battle with 
the courts so infuriated Roosevelt that he suggested Congress pass 
legislation regardless of concerns of constitutionality.61 In response to 
adverse court decisions, Roosevelt concocted his “court packing” plan 
to diminish the autonomy of the federal courts.62 The plan’s most 
drastic measure was to add more members to the Supreme Court—up 
to fifteen if Roosevelt had his way.63 This part of the plan, however, 
did not come to fruition, as the Supreme Court famously upheld a 
Washington state minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish64 that “eased the pressure”65 and caused Congress to “le[ave] 
the Supreme Court alone.”66 
 
 57. See Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 422; Solimine, supra note 23, at 124. 
 58. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) 
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act’s delegation of legislative power to the 
executive branch).  
 59. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936) (holding that Agricultural 
Adjustment Act provisions were an invalid exercise of the federal taxing and spending 
power). 
 60. See Currie, supra note 18, at 9. 
 61. For example, in a letter to Representative Samuel Hill, Roosevelt wrote the 
following: “I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to the constitutionality, 
however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation.” 79 CONG. REC. 13,449 (1935) 
(letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Rep. Samuel B. Hill (July 5, 1935)). 
 62. February 05, 1937: Roosevelt Announces “Court Packing Plan,” HISTORY.COM, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2015); see also Stephan O. Kline, Revisiting FDR’s Court Packing Plan: 
Are the Current Attacks on Judicial Independence so Bad?, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 863, 
864–65 (1999). 
 63. February 05, 1937: Roosevelt Announces “Court Packing Plan,” supra note 62.  
 64. 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937). This case still garners historical attention, as it 
involved the alleged change of mind by Justice Owen Roberts—“the switch in time that 
saved nine”—to uphold the law and save the integrity of the Supreme Court as it then 
existed. For more, see generally Kline, supra note 62 (analyzing the court packing plan in 
detail). 
 65. Currie, supra note 18, at 10. 
 66. Id. 
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Though much of the ill-fated “court packing” plan “spectacularly 
failed,”67 a remnant of the plan did survive and passed through 
Congress in 1937—the use of a three-judge court. The new statute 
expanded the jurisdiction of the three-judge district court to hear all 
actions for injunctions where the constitutionality of an act of 
Congress was challenged.68 The judges on the panel consisted of the 
district judge before whom the original action was filed and two other 
judges appointed by the chief judge of the circuit where the suit was 
brought.69 By mandating a three-judge court for suits attacking 
congressional legislation, Congress required that acts of Congress be 
treated with a dignity equal to that required for state legislation.70 The 
1937 revision to the Three-Judge Court Act propelled these 
specialized courts’ jurisdiction into another arena—constitutional 
litigation—an area that would see the use of these courts expand and 
flourish in the coming decades. 
4.  The Beginning of the End: The Three-Judge Court During the 
Civil Rights Movement 
The three-judge court originally had a narrow scope and saw few 
appeals during the early years of its implementation.71 The same 
cannot be said for the 1950s and 1960s. During those decades, the 
quantity of litigation before federal three-judge courts increased 
greatly.72 This increase can be explained in large part by the Civil 
Rights Movement.73 During this era, the function of three-judge 
courts shifted from protecting the states from the federal government 
to protecting private citizens from the states. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, plaintiffs in civil rights cases strove 
to find courts that they perceived as offering the best opportunity to 
 
 67. Michael Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional Courts, 
17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 124 (2014). 
 68. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2282 
(1910)) (repealed 1976). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Currie, supra note 18, at 11 (quoting 81 CONG. REC. 7045 (1937) (statement of 
Sen. O’Mahoney)).  
 71. Cf. Solimine, supra note 23, at 123–24 (explaining that a large reason behind the 
passage of the original 1910 Act was that the perceived burden of gathering three judges 
to hear a case would be tolerable because those judges would only be hearing federal 
issues “that were perceived to be more important than the issues raised in a typical case 
that might end up before the [Supreme] Court”). 
 72. See id. at 126 (citing AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 317–18 (1969)) (“In the 1950s, there were about 
fifty such cases each year, which steadily increased to about ninety each year during the 
early 1960s, to 215 in 1969, and to a high of 320 by 1973.”). 
 73. See id. 
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advance their causes.74 As such, from the beginning of its campaign to 
fight segregation in the federal courts, the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) strongly favored 
litigating in courts with three-judge panels. Perhaps the cleverest use 
of the three-judge court came in the landmark decision Brown v. 
Board of Education.75 The case stands as an example of why three-
judge courts were seen as advantageous to the advancement of racial 
equality. The advantages were twofold. 
First, Thurgood Marshall, then lead attorney for the plaintiffs, 
molded his legal strategy in a way that would take advantage of the 
three-judge court by tailoring lawsuits to attack state statutes rather 
than attacking school boards directly.76 Marshall believed the three-
judge courts both presented a way to potentially insulate his cases 
from adverse rulings of individual judges and gave judges protection 
to take the “bolder steps, on both the merits and remedies, that the 
cases demanded.”77 Second, Marshall and the NAACP saw that using 
the three-judge courts furnished a direct right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court.78 At the time, the Warren Court was perceived as a 
friendly tribunal, and, as such, the three-judge court offered a direct 
path to the Supreme Court, especially as compared to the usual 
appeals process.79  
The use of three-judge courts by civil rights organizations did not 
go unnoticed by Congress. Hoping to capitalize on the favorable 
environment the NAACP found in the courts, Congress provided 
provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 that expanded the use of three-judge courts.80 Of the two, the 
Voting Rights Act proposed the more expansive use of the three-
judge courts. Acknowledging the deep root of racial barriers in the 
South, the Act vested power in three-judge courts to hear any action 
in which a set of southern states called for a change in voting 
 
 74. See Mark Johnston, From Exclusion to Integration: The N.A.A.C.P’s Legal 
Campaign Against Educational Segregation, 3 VOCES NOVAE: CHAP. U. HIST. REV. 203, 
203–04 (2011). 
 75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 76. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL 
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 56 (1994). 
 77. Solimine, supra note 23, at 127. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 136. 
 80. See id. at 131–32; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat. 241 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964)) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 10101(g) (2014)); Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b–c (1965)) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.  10303(a) (2014)). 
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procedure. The Act also provided a direct right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court.81 
These uses of three-judge courts to protect individual rights 
against the states represented a shift away from the original 
justifications of the 1910 Act. Recall that the original rationale behind 
the panels was to protect states from the powers of the federal 
government.82 In the Civil Rights Era, the use of the panels changed. 
No longer were the courts used to protect states, but to attack state 
policies through the advancement of individual causes.83 Scholar 
Michael Solimine put it best when he noted that during this time 
period “Congress [and private citizens] utilize[ed] the three-judge 
court as a sword.”84 This ironic evolution of the utility of the three-
judge court, however, did not last. The end of the Civil Rights Era 
marked the twilight of the federal three-judge court.85 
5.  The 1976 Amendment and the Expiration of the Three-Judge 
Court 
Even as Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the three-judge 
court, there were those in Congress and the legal community who 
called for its abolition. These voices of dissent eventually won, 
culminating in 1976 with legislation that ended the use of the courts 
for suits regarding federal statutes.86 The road to the 1976 
amendment, which restricted the use of such panels, was paved by 
many. But the greatest influences were the federal judiciary and the 
legal academy. 
By the 1960s, prominent figures in the academic community were 
calling for the end of the three-judge court. Perhaps the strongest 
criticism of the use of the courts came from Professor David Currie of 
the University of Chicago.87 Currie questioned the need for such 
courts, arguing that “consuming the energies of three judges to 
conduct one trial is prima facie an egregious waste of resources.”88 
 
 81. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at 52 
U.S.C. § 10303 (a) (2014)). 
 82. See supra Section I.A.1.b. 
 83. See Johnston, supra note 74, at 203–04. 
 84. Solimine, supra note 23, at 134. 
 85. See infra Section I.A.5. 
 86. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part at 28 
U.S.C. § 2284 (1976)). 
 87. See Currie, supra note 18, at 2–3. David Currie was a renowned Professor of Law 
at the University of Chicago who specialized in constitutional history. See David P. Currie, 
1936–2007, U. CHI. SCH. L., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/currie (last visited July 12, 
2015). 
 88. Currie, supra note 18, at 2. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1893 (2015) 
2015] THREE-JUDGE PANELS IN N.C. 1907 
Other scholars echoed this argument, noting that “it is clear . . . that 
the three-judge court procedure has given rise to excessive and 
complex litigation which has become more acute than the original evil 
it was designed to eradicate.”89 To these commentators and others,90 
the inefficiency of the panels simply outweighed any positives that the 
courts offered. 
This criticism on its own may not have fueled the movement to 
end the three-judge district court. However, such critiques, when 
coupled with the increasingly antagonistic disposition of the federal 
courts, guaranteed the demise of the courts. Upon examination of the 
early Supreme Court’s tendency to narrowly interpret the court 
statutes, it is clear that the Court did not support outright the 
institution’s creation.91 But the federal judiciary’s largest influence on 
the abolition of these courts came through Chief Justice Warren 
Burger.92 More than any other chief justice, Chief Justice Burger 
“brought to the office a desire to increase administrative efficiencies 
of all sorts at all levels of the federal courts.”93 Chief Justice Burger 
relied heavily on a 1969 study by the American Law Institute 
(“ALI”)—which argued that the 1937 amendment should be 
 
 89. Marks & Schoem, supra note 18, at 439. 
 90. For other critiques, see Solimine, supra note 23, at 137 n.177. 
 91. Michael Solimine points to several instances where the Supreme Court in the 
1930s and 1940s disapproved of the use of such courts. He argues that the narrow 
interpretation given to the early three-judge statutes signaled that the Court was not 
willing to support a broad expansion of the courts’ use. See id. at 134–35 (“[A]lmost from 
the beginning, the Court construed the direct appeal statute to permit it to dispose of cases 
summarily without oral argument or a written explanatory opinion, in a manner similar to 
the denial of a writ of certiorari.”). 
 92. See generally Carl Tobias, Warren Burger and the Administration of Justice, 41 
VILL. L. REV. 505 (1996) (discussing Chief Justice Burger’s role in improving the 
administration of justice throughout the federal court system). This is not to say that other 
Supreme Court justices were not also critical of the use of the courts. Justice Potter 
Stewart, in Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, observed that it was 
important to continue to narrowly construe the three-judge statutes “in the interest of 
sound judicial administration.” 419 U.S. 90, 98 (1974). Later courts also cited their 
displeasure with the use of the three-judge district courts. One federal judge noted:  
  The legislative history of the repealing bill shows a thorough dissatisfaction 
with the operation of three-judge courts, finding the procedure to be confusing 
and inefficient. The Senate report states that “three-judge court procedure has 
recently been termed by one scholar, ‘the single worst feature in the Federal 
judicial system as we have it today.’ It has imposed a burden on the Federal courts 
and has provided a constant source of uncertainty and procedural pitfalls for 
litigants.” 
Gilliard v. Kirk, 614 F. Supp. 1203, 1204 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-204, at 2 
(1975)). 
 93. Solimine, supra note 23, at 139. 
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rescinded—to mount a campaign to abolish the use of the three-judge 
court.94 In 1972, the ALI released the Fruend Report, which 
recommended abandoning the three-judge court model.95 
By 1976, the death knell had sounded for the widespread use of 
the three-judge court. With growing opposition from the legal 
academy and the loss of the Supreme Court’s support, Congress 
largely discontinued the sixty-year-old practice.96 
6.  The Remnants 
Today, the use of three-judge courts remains most prominently 
in reapportionment cases.97 Congress has occasionally created these 
specialized courts to hear sensitive constitutional matters that require 
a rapid resolution and direct appeal to the Supreme Court. As a part 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Congress required 
the use of such panels.98 But whatever the three-judge court’s future 
in the federal judiciary, the legacy of its rise and fall stands as a useful 
starting point for understanding the current debate in North 
Carolina.99 
II.  THE NEW LAW: CREATION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT 
The creation of a three-judge court is not an entirely new 
concept in North Carolina. In 2003, North Carolina introduced 
 
 94. See id. at 138–39. 
 95. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF 
THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 596–99 (1973). 
 96. See Section I.A.5. 
 97. For a thorough discussion of the litigation and use of three-judge courts in 
reapportionment cases, see generally Michael Solimine, The Three Judge District Court in 
Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (1996) (discussing the structure, 
procedures, and operation of three-judge courts in these cases in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s). 
 98. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, § 403(a), 116 Stat. 81, 
113 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2002)). 
 99. As expansive as is the history of these panels in the federal courts, documentation 
of the history of its use on the state level is sparse. Few states across the country use three-
judge courts; such panels are rare, and where they do exist, they are narrowly tailored to 
serve a specific subject area of law. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-64b03(a)–(b) (2011) 
(providing for three-judge courts to hear school finance cases, but also all constitutional 
issues dealing with the power of schools boards, the state Board of Education, and the 
Commissioner of Education); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 751.035(1) (West Supp. 2012) 
(providing for three-judge courts to hear redistricting cases). Two other states, Alaska 
(ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.175 (2010)) and Colorado (Act of July 5, 1995, ch. 244, sec. 1, 
§ 16–11–103 Colo. Sess. Laws 1290, 1290 (repealed 2002)) have used three-judge court 
statutes to examine or set sentences in some limited number of criminal cases. 
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legislation to use three-judge courts to hear redistricting cases.100 The 
2003 law created a three-judge court composed of a senior superior 
court judge from Wake County and two other state superior court 
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina.101 The law prohibits former members of the state legislature 
from serving on these panels and requires that the state court, if it 
finds that the state’s redistricting plan is unlawful, must provide the 
legislature time to correct and redraw the districts.102 For ten years, 
three-judge courts existed solely to hear these matters. But in 2014, 
this all changed. Now, nestled within the language that allows panels 
to hear redistricting cases lies a vast departure from state-level civil 
procedure norms: a three-judge court to hear constitutional 
challenges. 
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation that 
created a specialized court to hear all constitutional challenges to 
state laws.103 The public statements of legislators allow a glimpse into 
the motives behind the law. In response to a recent decision striking 
down the general assembly’s teacher tenure plan, then-Senate leader 
Phil Berger opined that Judge Hobgood’s ruling was “a classic case of 
judicial activism.”104 Francis C. De Luca, a member of the 
conservative Civitas Institute think-tank, echoed these sentiments, 
admitting that “it had always bugged [me] that a local judge, maybe 
not even elected, could just stop in its track an entire state law that 
had been approved by both bodies and signed by the governor.”105 
Thus, as followed Ex parte Young, fear of judicial activism and 
 
 100. Act of Nov. 25, 2003, ch. 434, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws (1st Extra Sess. 2003) (codified 
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1 (2003)), amended by Current Operations and Capital 
Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch. 100, § 18B.16. (a), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. 
Serv. 241 (LexisNexis).  
 101. Id. (“Upon receipt of that complaint, the senior resident superior court judge of 
Wake County shall notify the Chief Justice, who shall appoint two additional resident 
superior court judges to the three-judge court of the Superior Court of Wake County to 
hear and determine the action.”). 
 102. Id. (“In order to ensure fairness, to avoid the appearance of impropriety, and to 
avoid political bias, no member of the panel, including the senior resident superior court 
judge of Wake County, may be a former member of the General Assembly.”). 
 103. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch. 
100, § 18B.16.(a), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 241 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C GEN. 
STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (2014)) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General 
Assembly shall be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be 
heard and determined by a three-judge court.”). 
 104. Laura Leslie, Judge: Stripping veteran teachers of tenure rights unconstitutional, 
WRAL (Raleigh) (May 16, 2014), http://www.wral.com/judge-stripping-veteran-teachers-
of-tenure-rights-unconstitutional/13650846/; see Jarvis, supra note 9. 
 105. See Jarvis, supra note 9. 
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dissatisfaction with courts’ invalidation of legislation are at the root of 
the new law. Now, the North Carolina General Assembly has set a 
course to remedy these concerns, but it will not come without costs. 
This Part will explore North Carolina’s creation of the three-judge 
court to hear constitutional challenges and explain the key facets of 
this law. 
A. Creation of a Court to Hear Constitutional Challenges 
North Carolina law now provides: “any facial challenge to the 
validity of an act of the general assembly shall be transferred . . . to 
the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be heard and 
determined by a three-judge court of the Superior Court of Wake 
County.”106 As written, the new law requires any and all facial 
challenges to any law passed by the general assembly to be moved to 
Raleigh, North Carolina (the seat of the Wake County Superior 
Court), no matter where in the state the original action is brought.107 
Thus, conceivably any civil lawsuit that wholly or partially consists of 
a constitutional challenge will be uprooted and moved to Wake 
County.108 
An additional feature of the panels is that their members will be 
chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North 
 
 106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (2014). 
 107. Id. Unfortunately, the statute neglects to define what constitutes a facial challenge 
as compared to a challenge that is “as applied.” See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial 
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994) (stating that 
courts declare federal and state statutes unconstitutional in two ways. First, “the court may 
declare it invalid on its face” or a “court may find the statute unconstitutional as applied to 
a particular set of circumstances.” In the former situation, “the state may not enforce it 
under any circumstances” whereas in the latter “the state may enforce the statute in 
different circumstance”). However, case law may suggest something of an answer. In the 
federal courts, a facial challenge requires that a plaintiff “establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which [an act] would be valid.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. 
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008). North Carolina case law on the subject is 
limited, but it largely mirrors the federal courts. See State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 496–
503, 508 S.E.2d 277, 285–89 (1998) (denying a facial challenge to a domestic violence law 
but finding the law unconstitutional as it was applied to the present defendant). 
 108. The problems inherent with this ambiguity will be discussed below. See infra 
Section III.B. It should be noted that these panels will not hear “as applied” challenges. 
Instead, the original Superior Court judge will continue to hear these cases and will 
maintain the power to grant or deny an injunction. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3). 
Also, facial challenges to state laws are strictly circumscribed to civil actions and outside 
the reach of any criminal proceeding. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (“Nothing in this 
section shall be deemed to apply to criminal proceedings, to proceedings under Chapter 
15A of the General Statutes, to proceedings making a collateral attack on any judgment 
entered in a criminal proceeding, or to appeals from orders of the trial courts pertaining to 
civil proceedings filed by a taxpayer pursuant to G.S. 105-241-17.”). 
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Carolina.109 This power is not without limits. In order to ensure 
geographic diversity on the panel, the chief justice “shall appoint to 
the three-judge court one resident superior court judge from the First, 
Second, or Fourth Judicial Division, one resident superior court judge 
from the Seventh or Eighth Judicial Division, and one resident 
superior court judge from the Third, Fifth, or Sixth Judicial 
Division.”110 Though the law does set out some parameters within 
which the chief justice must confine his or her decision, there are few 
guidelines to ensure methodological consistency in the chief justice’s 
appointment decisions. 
B. Trial Consolidation and Venue 
Another facet of this new law is the limited jurisdiction granted 
to the panels. The panels are not tasked with deciding entire cases, 
but only those claims facially challenging the constitutionality of a 
state law.111 As the statute is written, a claim will only be transferred 
and a three-judge court convened if “after all other questions of law 
in the action have been resolved, a determination as to the facial 
validity of an act of the general assembly must be made in order to 
completely resolve any issues in the case.”112 It seems from the 
language that if the original court can completely resolve the case 
without reaching the constitutional issue, a potential constitutional 
claim could be dead on arrival.  
Along with their limited scope of review, there is no mechanism 
in the law to automatically convene the panels. This is because the 
language of the statute gives the power to transfer venue to the 
original, superior court “on its own motion.”113 There is nothing the 
parties can do. If venue is transferred to a three-judge court, the 
original action will not be automatically stayed, but all matters that 
are “contingent on the outcome of the challenge” will be.114 Finally, 
 
 109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (“[T]he Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall 
appoint three resident superior court judges to a three-judge court of the Superior Court 
of Wake County to hear the challenge.”). 
 110. Id. § 1-267.1(b)(2). 
 111. Id. § 1-267.1(a1) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General 
Assembly shall be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be 
heard and determined by a three-judge court.”). 
 112. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch. 
100, § 18B.16.(b), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 243 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C GEN. 
STAT. § 1-81.1(a1) (2014)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42. The original language of the bill called for an 
automatic stay of all proceedings, but it was dropped before it was passed in the Senate. 
See Jarvis, supra note 9. 
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following the decision by the three-judge court and after exhaustion 
of all rights to appeal, the action will be transferred back to the 
original court for resolution of any remaining issues.115 The bill’s 
language reveals just how specialized and singular the role of these 
courts will be—decide the constitutional issue and remand the case to 
the original court.116 
C. Rights of Appeal 
The final aspect of this complicated law is the unique appeals 
process it establishes. The law bifurcates the appeals process 
depending on the result reached by the three-judge court.117 If a panel 
invalidates an act of the general assembly, the new legislation 
provides an automatic right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina.118 But if a challenge to a state law is rejected, no such 
right of direct appeal exists.119 Instead, the party bringing the claim 
must pursue an appeal through the usual appeals process.120 This 
appeals process is unbalanced, providing one side with a fast track to 
a final decision by the supreme court while relegating the other to the 
normal pace of the court system. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW 
From the above discussion, it is clear that this legislation stands 
to impact civil procedure in the state for years to come.121 But those 
who study, practice in, and depend on the legal system should not 
accept this law without scrutiny. Careful examination of the law 
reveals a variety of concerns and questions to be answered before 
embracing this procedure. Of the many questions the law raises, the 
 
 115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42 (“Once the three-judge court has ruled and all 
appeal rights have been exhausted, the matter shall be transferred or remanded to the 
three-judge court . . . for resolution of any outstanding matters, as appropriate.”). 
 116. See id. (“[The case shall be transferred] to the Superior Court of Wake County for 
resolution by a three-judge court if, after all other matters in the action have been 
resolved, a determination as to the facial validity of an act of the General Assembly must 
be made in order to completely resolve any matters in the case.”). 
 117. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a1) (“Appeal lies of right directly to the Supreme 
Court from any order or judgment of a court, either final or interlocutory, that holds that 
an act of the General Assembly is facially invalid on the basis that the act violates the 
North Carolina Constitution or federal law.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Act of Aug. 2, 2014, ch. 102, § 1, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws at 65–67 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2014)).  
 120. See id. (“Appeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals in any of the 
following cases: From any final judgment of a superior court, other than the one described 
in subsection (a) of this section . . . .”). 
 121. See supra Part II. 
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first and perhaps most pressing question is whether the law passes 
constitutional muster. Analysis of the North Carolina Constitution, 
however, reveals weaknesses in arguments contending that these 
panels are unconstitutional. Specifically, these three-judge courts 
raise two central issues: (1) whether this three-judge court creates a 
new court as prohibited by the North Carolina Constitution, and (2) 
whether the legislation unconstitutionally restricts a court’s 
jurisdiction. These are addressed in turn. 
A. Does North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-267.1(a1) Create 
a New Court? 
North Carolina General Statute § 1-267(a1) calls for the creation 
of a three-judge court to hear all facial constitutional challenges 
raised by any case across the state.122 In doing so, it pulls superior 
court judges from various regions to hear the constitutional challenge 
and establishes these panels as the sole means through which such a 
challenge can be heard.123 Article IV, section 1 of the North Carolina 
Constitution prohibits the legislature from creating new courts and 
only recognizes four distinct types of courts: the supreme court, the 
court of appeals, the superior courts, and the district courts.124 Though 
an offshoot of the superior court, these panels seem to be a new court. 
The North Carolina Constitution provides no language that 
allows for the superior courts to sit in a division or panel.125 Unlike 
sections 6 and 7 of Article IV, which authorize the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina and the North Carolina Court of Appeals to sit in 
divisions, such language is absent from section 9’s discussion of 
 
 122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (“For each challenge to the validity of statutes and 
acts subject to subsection (a1) of this section, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall 
appoint three resident superior court judges to a three-judge court . . . hear the 
challenge.”). 
 123. See id. (“To ensure that members of each three-judge court are drawn from 
different regions of the State, the Chief Justice shall appoint to each three-judge court one 
resident superior court judge from the First, Second, or Fourth Judicial Division, one 
resident superior court judge from the Seventh or Eighth Judicial Division, and one 
resident superior court judge from the Third, Fifth, or Sixth Judicial Division.”). 
 124. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“[The] General Assembly shall have no power to 
deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as 
a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall it establish or authorize any courts 
other than as permitted by this Article.”); see also id. §§ 6–10 (detailing the composition of 
the various North Carolina courts, including the supreme court, court of appeals, superior 
courts, and district courts). 
 125. See id. § 9. 
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superior courts.126 The language of section 9 does provide for “one or 
more superior court judges for each district” but does not dictate how 
those judges are to hear cases.127 Even a historical examination of the 
sections yields no answers as to whether the framers intended for 
superior courts to empanel.128 This absence of express authority is 
even more conspicuous when analyzed next to provisions that 
expressly give the general assembly power over the judicial system. 
The North Carolina Constitution explicitly grants to the general 
assembly the power to determine the structure, organization, and 
composition of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.129 Section 6 
allows the General Assembly to increase the number of associate 
justices up to eight.130 But the provision dealing with superior courts is 
silent on the issue.131 Nowhere does it spell out how many superior 
court judges are allowed to hear a single proceeding, and the absence 
of such language in this provision in light of its presence in the other 
provisions is conspicuous. Examining only the language of the 
constitution, it is difficult to see how the use of a three-judge court 
can fit into the constitutional definition of the superior court. 
In addition to a four-corners reading of the constitution, case law 
further calls into question whether the three-judge court constitutes a 
new court. State v. Matthews132 presented the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina with the opportunity to define the meaning of a “court” 
within section 1 of Article IV of the North Carolina Constitution.133 
There, the court ruled that a statute allowing police officers to issue 
search warrants was unconstitutional because it authorized the use of 
 
 126. See id. § 6 (providing that the supreme court “shall consist of a Chief Justice and 
six [but not more than eight] Associate Justices”); id. § 7 (“The Court shall have not less 
than five members, and may be authorized to sit in divisions, or other than en banc.”). 
 127. Id. § 9. 
 128. Historically, superior court judges have exercised their judicial authority 
individually, not jointly or empaneled with other judges. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL 
NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 130–33 (2013) (explaining the 
North Carolina Constitution’s provisions that allow the supreme court and the court of 
appeals to sit in panels, but not providing similar commentary with regard to the superior 
courts). 
 129. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (“The structure, organization, and composition of the 
Court of Appeals shall be determined by the General Assembly.”). 
 130. Id. § 6 (“[T]he General Assembly may increase the number of Associate Justices 
to not more than eight.”). 
 131. Id. § 9 (containing no such language). 
 132. 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967). 
 133. Id. at 41, 153 S.E.2d at 796 (“There remains for consideration whether the 
General Assembly can confer upon a police officer judicial power sufficient to authorize 
the issuance of a valid warrant under any circumstances . . . [t]he answer to this question is 
to be found in Article IV of the Constitution of North Carolina.”). 
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judicial power by entities not authorized by the constitution.134 To the 
court, allowing a police officer to perform the job of a judge was 
enough to constitute the establishment of a new court.135 In the 
present context the issue is not nearly as clear-cut. The legislation 
provides that superior court judges perform their usual duties but in a 
different form.136 But this change in form can be seen as a change with 
respect to what the constitution contemplates as a “superior court 
district.”137 Though there is no separation of powers issue,138 three 
judges performing the duties of what previously was done by one 
judge could be construed as an exercise of judicial authority outside 
the purview of the constitution. 
These arguments are unlikely to persuade a court to hold the 
creation and use of a three-judge court unconstitutional. As noted 
above, North Carolina has used three-judge courts to hear 
redistricting cases since 2003.139 Because the current statute was 
added to the language of the redistricting statute, many arguments 
that the creation of a three-judge court constitutes an unconstitutional 
new court are foreclosed. Stephenson v. Bartlett,140 which upheld the 
constitutionality of the panels to hear redistricting cases, addressed 
many of these arguments.141 The Bartlett court gave short shrift to the 
challenge presented. It was enough that the statute purported to 
extend the procedures of the superior court without creating a court 
outside of the constitution’s framework.142 In fact, the court dismissed 
any real concern in a sentence, stating, “[t]his language places 
redistricting challenges in the superior court, the court recognized by 
the North Carolina Constitution as having original jurisdiction 
throughout the state.”143 
 
 134. Id. at 43, 153 S.E.2d at 797. 
 135. Id. at 42, 153 S.E.2d at 797 (“A police officer is not an official of the General 
Court of Justice . . . . Hence, the General Assembly lacks constitutional authority to confer 
judicial power upon a police officer.”). 
 136. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (2014). 
 137. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (“The General Assembly shall, from time to time, 
divide the State into a convenient number of Superior Court judicial districts and shall 
provide for the election of one or more Superior Court Judges for each district.”). 
 138. See infra notes 146–55 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text. 
 140. 358 N.C. 219, 595 S.E.2d 112 (2004). 
 141. Id. at 227, 595 S.E.2d at 117–18. 
 142. Id. at 227, 595 S.E.2d at 118 (“[The] language [of the statute] places redistricting 
challenges in the superior court, the court recognized by the North Carolina Constitution 
as having original general jurisdiction throughout the state.”). 
 143. Id.  
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Because the current legislation mirrors the language used by the 
2003 redistricting statute,144 there is little reason to expect a different 
result. The Bartlett court’s quick dismissal of the issue may be an 
indicator of the likely result of any challenge to the constitutionality 
of these panels. Moreover, since the issue is no longer a matter of first 
impression, stare decisis may keep any challenger from getting 
another bite at the apple. 
B. Does Amended North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-81.1 
Unconstitutionally Restrict the Jurisdiction of Constitutional 
Challenges? 
The law’s venue requirement raises a second question of 
constitutionality. Venue is a procedural matter that the constitution 
authorizes the general assembly to establish and dictate for the 
superior court division.145 A venue provision simply sets the rules for 
where an action is to be tried.146 The problem with the current 
legislation is that it seems to cross the line from a mere venue 
provision to one that limits the superior court’s jurisdiction to hear 
constitutional cases.147 The statute establishes Wake County as the 
exclusive venue for these three-judge courts.148 But in doing so, it 
effectively limits the jurisdiction of constitutional cases to Wake 
County Superior Court.149 Ordinarily, limiting the jurisdiction of the 
 
 144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (2014) (providing for the appointment of similar 
three-judge courts by the chief justice in cases where the constitutionality of an act of the 
North Carolina General Assembly is at issue). 
 145. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (“The General Assembly may make rules of 
procedure and practice for the Superior Court and District Court Divisions, and the 
General Assembly may delegate this authority to the Supreme Court.”). 
 146. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-82 (“In all other cases the action must be tried in the 
county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants . . . reside at its commencement.”). 
 147. The principle that when the jurisdiction of a particular court is constitutionally 
defined the legislature cannot by statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction unless 
authorized to do so by the constitution is grounded in the separation of powers provisions. 
See Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 327, 222 S.E.2d 412, 427–28 (1976) (“It is well settled that 
the general assembly is without power to prescribe or to regulate the rules of practice or 
procedure in the Supreme Court, in accordance with which it shall exercise its appellate 
jurisdiction.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 
N.C. 127, 140, 337 S.E.2d 477, 484 (1985). 
 148. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, ch. 
100, § 1-81.1(a1), 2014-4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 243 (LexisNexis) (codified at N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 1-81.1(a1) (2014)). 
 149. Venue and jurisdiction are distinct concepts. Venue is the place where a cause is 
to be tried, whereas jurisdiction refers to the power the court has to render a judgment. 
See Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 508–09, 78 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1953) (explaining the 
difference between jurisdiction and venue provisions in the North Carolina General 
Statutes). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1893 (2015) 
2015] THREE-JUDGE PANELS IN N.C. 1917 
superior court is prohibited under the state constitution, as superior 
courts are deemed courts of “original jurisdiction”150 that are “open at 
all times for the transaction of all business . . . . ”151 This suggests that 
each superior court judge should have equal and coordinate power as 
others throughout the state. But the new legislation prevents this. For 
example, previously, if a case arose in Jackson County, a Jackson 
County judge would have heard the case. But today, there is no 
guarantee that a Jackson County judge will be selected to sit on the 
panel, as the statute only provides that one of the three judges 
originate from preselected parts of the state.152 At bottom, the statute 
seems to usurp power from what are supposed to be equal and 
coordinate courts. 
Despite this contradiction, the new legislation is unlikely to fail a 
constitutional challenge. The North Carolina General Statutes allow 
for some flexibility in venue provisions. For example, Section 1-83(2) 
allows for changing the place of trial “when the convenience of 
witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the 
change.”153 While this language may not directly approve of the 
change in venue mandated by the three-judge court statute, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has used it to authorize other 
superior court panels.154 In Bartlett, the court upheld the use of three-
judge courts for redistricting cases by relying, in part, on Section 1-
83(2). The court suggested that the “policies implied” in the statutory 
provision allowed for the redistricting courts to be held in Wake 
County.155 
Unfortunately, the Bartlett court failed to explain why a three-
judge court met the criteria of Section 1-83(2). Despite this, venue 
appears to be a malleable procedural matter subject to minimal 
constitutional scrutiny.156 Accordingly, it is hard to see how the 
current legislation could fall to a challenge on these grounds.  
 
 150. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(3) (“[T]he Superior Court shall have original 
general jurisdiction throughout the State.”). 
 151. Id. § 9(2). 
 152. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(b2) (2014). 
 153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83(2) (2013); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 358 N.C. 219, 228, 595 
S.E.2d 112, 118 (2004) (“In addition, once an action is filed, venue is sufficiently flexible 
that it may be changed according to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83(2).”). 
 154. Bartlett, 358 N.C. at 228, 595 S.E.2d at 118. 
 155. Id.  
 156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83(2) (providing for a change of venue when “the 
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change”); 
Bartlett, 358 N.C. at 228, 595 S.E.2d at 118. 
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C. The Three-Judge Court and the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
In addition to these more specific constitutional questions, the 
three-judge court legislation passed by the North Carolina General 
Assembly raises a broader separation of powers issue. The mechanics 
of the law create tension between the judicial and legislative branches 
of the state government. Despite this tension, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina would find a separation of powers 
argument persuasive. 
Article I, section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution provides: 
“The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State 
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.”157 
The wording seems to forbid overlaps of power between the three 
branches, but North Carolina courts have not interpreted the 
language so strictly. Perhaps the best example of the provision’s 
interpretation is found in Adams v. North Carolina Department of 
Natural and Human Resources.158 In Adams, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina, in a discussion regarding the relationship between 
the legislative and judicial branches, stated, “it has long been 
recognized by this Court that the problems which a modern 
legislature must confront are of such complexity that strict adherence 
to ideal notions of the non-delegation doctrine would unduly hamper 
the General Assembly in the exercise of its constitutionally vested 
powers.”159 Though speaking about the non-delegation doctrine, 
implications for the present context can be seen. The court is unlikely 
to construe the separation of powers doctrine so as to disallow some 
overlap in the powers of the branches of government. As Professor 
John Orth notes, “although separation of powers and the related 
principle of checks and balances underlie American constitutions, 
they have rarely figured as such in the important constitutional 
decisions rendered by American courts.”160 
 
 157. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6. This doctrine has long held a significant place in North 
Carolina’s Constitution, and the wording of the clause has remained the same since the 
first constitution was ratified in 1776. See John V. Orth, “Forever Separate and Distinct”: 
Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (“The principle of 
separation of powers has been explicitly proclaimed in each successive North Carolina 
Constitution with only slight variations in wording.”). 
 158. 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978). 
 159. Id. at 696–97, 249 S.E.2d at 410. For other examples of this interpretation of the 
separation of powers doctrine, see Orth, supra note 157, at 8 n.45 (“Notwithstanding the 
asserted absence of cases involving a separation of powers claim, the North Carolina 
Reports contain numerous such cases, some of them quite recent.”). 
 160. Orth, supra note 157, at 1; see also Jacob Scot, Codified Canons and the Common 
Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 382–83 (2010) (“Judges have developed common 
law canons to protect and reinforce the separation of powers across constitutionally 
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 Coupled with the diminished state of the separation of powers 
doctrine, a constitutional challenge would also have to confront the 
strong presumption of constitutionality courts give to laws passed by 
the general assembly. The clearest language establishing this 
presumption is in Rowlette v. State.161 There, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals gave great weight to the presumption of constitutionality, 
stating that, “unless the unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and 
unmistakably appears beyond a reasonable doubt” the state’s 
legislation will be upheld.162 Indeed, such a demanding standard will 
be difficult for potential challenges to overcome. 
In the end, any constitutional challenge to this law is likely to fail. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected many of the 
applicable arguments when the three-judge court concept was first 
brought to the state,163 and the three-judge court now created to hear 
constitutional challenges possesses a structure and function similar to 
its predecessor. In light of a weak separation of powers doctrine and 
the strong presumption of constitutionality for laws passed by the 
General Assembly, it is hard to imagine a court abolishing this new 
law. 
IV.  “LET REASON HOLD THE REINS”:164 A CALL TO QUESTION THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF NORTH CAROLINA’S NEW LAW 
Even if North Carolina’s new three-judge court is constitutional, 
this does not answer the question posited at the beginning of this 
Comment—is this law a good idea? To answer that question, we must 
look to the law’s probable effects and consequences and weigh them 
against the purported state interest in empaneling three-judge courts 
to hear constitutional challenges. On one side of the scale is the 
importance of protecting legislative action and preventing venue 
shopping.165 On the other side, this seismic shift in adjudicative 
procedure will mar the efficiency of the court system. Additionally, 
 
created governmental organs. The avoidance canon buttresses legislative authority to 
make law and, at the same time, acknowledges judicial review to prevent the legislature 
from overstepping its power.”). 
 161. 188 N.C. App. 712, 656 S.E.2d 619 (2008), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 474, 666 
S.E.2d 487 (2008). 
 162. Id. at 715, 656 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Guilford 
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 110 N.C. App. 506, 511, 430 S.E.2d 681, 684–85 (1993)). 
 163. Supra notes 132–43 and accompanying text. 
 164. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANAC 30 (U.S.C. Publishing Co. 
1914). 
 165. See Jarvis, supra note 9 (“We wanted to do something [about venue shopping] 
that would help the process, also help with the efficiency of having these matters that are 
challenged heard in a consistent method for that.”). 
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the law raises serious concern about the politicization of the judiciary, 
which has the potential to damage the integrity of the courts. Each of 
these concerns must be addressed in turn. 
A. Practical Problems 
The procedural mechanisms adopted by this new law are 
complex.166 It is important to discern whether this drastic change is 
practical. This section suggests two lenses through which to evaluate 
the law’s practicality: efficiency and cost.  
1.  Efficiency 
The first way to explore the practicality of this new legislation is 
by examining its efficiency. The law’s ambiguity and the burden it 
places on the court system will cause inefficiencies in the court 
system. These problems will be addressed in turn.  
a. Ambiguity in the Law 
In order to promote justice, courts must run effectively and 
efficiently.167 The present legislation fails to advance these goals. This 
is largely attributable to the law’s ambiguity. A close reading of the 
statute raises more questions than answers. The law will likely cause 
confusion among practitioners across the state.  
First, consider the provision in the law providing that a three-
judge court only convene if “all other matters in the action have been 
resolved” and a determination of constitutionality must be made to 
resolve the matter.168 This presents a question of interpretation for 
courts. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical: A plaintiff, 
in this case the state, brings an action alleging that the defendant 
violated a state statute. In its defense, the defendant argues that it did 
not actually violate the statute, and in the alternative, that the statute 
is facially unconstitutional. 
 The language of the statute offers no clear answer as to what the 
court should do. If the original superior court judge decides that the 
factual contentions should be heard first, what happens to the 
constitutional challenge? If the court finds that the defendant did not 
violate the state statute, technically this will resolve the lawsuit 
because a determination as to the constitutionality would have no 
 
 166. See supra Part II. 
 167. See Warren Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary—1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049, 
1049 (1972) (“Those who protest that efficiency is not the role of justice must be reminded 
that protracting one case imposes hardship on all others awaiting their turn.”). 
 168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 42 (2014). 
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bearing on the result. But if the initial judge transferred the initial 
decision to the three-judge court for a ruling on the constitutionality 
of the law, and if the three-judge court found the law 
unconstitutional, it would decide the case before any other matter was 
considered before the original court. Indeed, the case may reach the 
same conclusion, but it is discomforting and confusing that a rather 
straightforward fact pattern can take either of two different 
procedural paths and, at least in some instances, limit the arguments 
brought by both parties. At bottom, it will all depend on the 
interpretation of what “must be made in order to completely resolve” 
the matters in the case.169 But because the law gives no guidance on 
what factual assertions must be resolved before a three-judge court is 
needed, litigants may receive inconsistent treatment depending on the 
discretion of the original trial judge. 
The appellate process created by the law adds to its ambiguity 
and inefficiency. As noted above, the new legislation mandates an 
asymmetrical appeals process based on the initial ruling of the three-
judge court.170 Recall the hypothetical posed above. Assume that the 
initial superior court judge sends the case to a three-judge court to 
hear the constitutional challenge. The case will be sent to Raleigh.171 
From there, the path of the case becomes complicated. If the three-
judge court holds that the state statute in question is unconstitutional, 
then the state has a right to immediate appeal to the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina.172 If the statute is held constitutional, then the case 
is sent back to the original superior court, subject only to the usual 
appeals process.173 Once the three-judge court is empanelled, the 
original superior court must “stay all matters that are contingent upon 
the outcome of the challenge to the act’s facial validity pending a 
ruling on that challenge and until all appeal rights are exhausted.”174 
This means that if the plaintiff chooses to appeal the constitutional 
ruling, then the case will have to go through the entire appellate 
process before any of the factual matters of the case are heard. Taken 
 
 169. Id. § 1-81-1(a1). 
 170. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-267.1(a1) (“[A]ny facial challenge to the validity of an act 
of the General Assembly shall be transferred . . . to the Superior Court of Wake 
County.”). 
 172. See id. § 7A-27(a1) (“Appeal lies of right directly to the Supreme Court from any 
order or judgment of a court . . . that holds that an act of the General Assembly is facially 
invalid on the basis that the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law.”). 
 173. See id. § 7A-27(b)(1). 
 174. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 42 (“The court in which the action originated . . . shall stay all 
matters that are contingent upon the outcome of the challenge to the act’s facial 
validity.”). 
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to an extreme, if the plaintiff or defendant chooses to appeal the 
factual ruling of the superior court after all of the constitutional issues 
have been resolved, then it looks like the case will yet again make its 
way through the court system until final resolution. In short, the 
three-judge court could add two different courts, four different 
judges, and two different locations to any litigation involving a facial 
constitutional challenge. Such an onerous process is the epitome of 
inefficiency. 
Another concern is that the law does not dictate how colorable a 
constitutional claim must be before it is sent to a three-judge court. 
As written, the legislation mandates that “any facial challenge” must 
be sent to Wake County if deemed necessary.175 It seems, at least 
from a strict reading of the text, that no matter the viability of the 
claim, if resolution of a constitutional claim is necessary, it will be sent 
to a three-judge court. There apparently is no filter for frivolous 
claims.176 In the appeals context, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina has ruled that an appellant seeking review as a matter of 
right must “allege and show the involvement of such question or 
suffer dismissal” and that “[t]he question must be real and substantial 
rather than superficial and frivolous.”177 Thus, meritless appeals are 
sure to be dismissed.178 It is unclear how the viability of these claims 
will be judged. Does the trial court make an initial ruling? Or does 
the claim automatically go to the three-judge court without any 
scrutiny? The former would defeat some of the purpose of having a 
panel, and the latter opens up the three-judge courts to becoming a 
weapon for litigators. If the law stands as is, litigators seeking to gain 
an upper hand on their opponent could tack on frivolous 
constitutional claims and force the other party to defend the 
additional claim.179 The fear is that that these cases become more 
about the parties’ financial resources than the merits of the case. 
 
 175. Id. § 1-267.1(a1) (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. (drawing no distinction between the type of constitutional claim that has to be 
brought). 
 177. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 305, 163 S.E.2d 376, 383 (1968), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 1087 (1969). 
 178. See id. (“The question must be real and substantial rather than superficial and 
frivolous.”). 
 179. To date, this tactic has not been used. However, as North Carolina becomes used 
to the mechanics of the law, it is not impossible. 
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b. “If Past is Prologue”: Lessons from the Federal Use of Three-
Judge Courts 
Even if we ignore the problems caused by the law’s ambiguity 
and concomitant inefficiencies, the North Carolina General Assembly 
would be wise to consider the demise of the federal three-judge court. 
History provides a useful reminder of the burdens that flow from this 
kind of legislation.180 
The federal three-judge court largely owes its abolition to the 
burdens that the process imposed.181 The 1969 American Law 
Institute Report and the 1972 Federal Judicial Center Report are 
instructive. The two main issues raised in the former report were the 
increasing number of hearings convened before the three-judge 
courts and the corresponding increase of direct appeals to the 
Supreme Court.182 The report found that in the 1950s there were 
around fifty cases each year, but the number had increased to 215 by 
1969.183 Three years later, the Federal Judicial Center reviewed those 
statistical findings and concluded that the increasingly heavy caseload 
brought by these panels was too great to justify maintaining the 
panels’ existence.184 
The administrative difficulties examined in these reports also 
inform the present context. The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
considered and issued full opinions in more than fifty cases in 2014.185 
 
 180. See supra Section I.A. 
 181. See Currie, supra note 18, at 2; see also Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, 
Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 767, 783 (2007) (“Opposition to the three-judge court eventually arose in the federal 
judiciary itself, in part based on the inconvenience of convening such courts at the trial 
level, and in part due to the burden direct appeals placed on the Supreme Court’s 
docket.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts, 17 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 125 (2014) (“Whatever the benefits of the three-judge district 
court to litigants, particularly plaintiffs, many other influential observers eventually 
concluded that they were outweighed by the administrative burdens on the courts.”). 
 182. AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURTS 317–18 (1969) (“Concern over the burden that the three-judge 
court statutes impose on the federal judiciary has heightened as the number of cases heard 
by such courts has increased.”). 
 183. See id. at 317 (“The annual reports of the Administrative Office show that for the 
years 1955–1959, the average number of such cases heard was 48.8 per year. In the years 
1960–64, the average per year was 95.6 such cases.”). 
 184. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF 
THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 596–99 (1972) (recommending 
elimination of the three-judge court and direct review). 
 185. N.C. Appellate Courts, N.C. CT. SYS., http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/ (last 
visited July 13, 2015). 
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In addition, the court considered hundreds of other matters.186 The 
new appeals process may greatly increase the number of cases the 
supreme court could possibly hear. 187 The earlier hypothetical alludes 
to this problem. 188 If the supreme court hears an earlier direct appeal 
and then sends the case back down to the original superior court, 
there is still a chance that other factual matters may find their way 
back in front of the court. 
Such an occurrence may be rare, but another recently enacted 
bill by the general assembly may exacerbate the problem.189 Senate 
Bill 853 rewrote North Carolina General Statute § 71-27, giving an 
appeal of right to all North Carolina Business Court litigants directly 
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.190 This stands to increase the 
number of cases that the supreme court will hear.191 Thus, when 
considered with the business court legislation, there may well be a rise 
in administrative burdens and a heavier docket for the court.192 
This inefficiency and increased burden on the judiciary is not 
worth the law’s benefits. History has shown how the experiment will 
end. The General Assembly has not offered new reasoning for the 
need for these panels; Phil Berger’s exhortation that these panels will 
cure judicial activism echoes the calls of the past.193 The difference is 
that now we know that the benefits of three-judge courts do not 
 
 186. See id. (noting that these other matters may include “notices of appeals based 
upon constitutional questions, petitions for discretionary review, petitions for writ of 
certiorari in death cases, death stays, petitions for writ of certiorari in other criminal and 
civil cases, petitions for writ of supersedeas, motions for temporary stays, petitions for writ 
of mandamus, motions for appropriate relief, and direct appeals from decisions of the 
Judicial Standards Commissions and the Utilities Commission”). 
 187. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2013) (instituting an appeal as a matter of right to 
the Supreme Court from any decision of the court of appeals that involves a “substantial 
question arising” under the Constitution of North Carolina). 
 188. See supra text accompanying notes 168–70. 
 189. See generally Act of Aug. 2, 2014, ch. 102, § 1, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 65–67 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2014)). 
 190. Id. (providing an appeal of right directly to the supreme court from specified final 
judgments and interlocutory orders from the business court). 
 191. Before this law, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had heard one appeal from 
the business court since January 1, 2013. 
 192. Indeed, there are already issues with the funding of North Carolina’s judicial 
branch receives. Adding the numbers of cases that are heard by the Supreme Court will 
surely add to the burden. See Yoon Ju Chung, NC’s Top Judge Says the State’s Justice 
System Needs Funds, DAILY TAR HEEL (Chapel Hill) (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www 
.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/03/ncs-top-judge-says-the-states-justice-system-needs-funds 
(“The low budget allotted for local judicial systems [may] hinder timely trials due to the 
workforce reduction.”). 
 193. See supra notes 48 &104 and accompanying text. 
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outweigh the harm they cause. As such, it would be wise to heed the 
warnings of history and do away with these panels. 
2.  Increased Cost and Concomitant Effect on Access to Justice 
Thus far, the discussion of the practical effects of the three-judge 
court has focused on the ambiguities associated with the law and the 
burdens that the judicial system will now face. Now we must turn to 
the possible effects this law will have on litigants. It is particularly 
vital to assess the negative effects this law could have on the state’s 
indigent population. Though the new panels will force all litigants to 
adjust to the new procedures, the law’s potential adverse effect on 
access to justice underscores why it should be opposed. 
Today, equal access to justice remains something of a chimera.194 
Much blame can be ascribed to the rising cost of litigation. The cost of 
bringing a matter to court often “prevents more and more Americans 
from realizing their rights.”195 The poor have a much higher frequency 
of interaction with the justice system on a day-to-day basis than other 
groups.196 For them, the law is “repeatedly encountered in the most 
ordinary transactions and events of their lives.”197 As such, this group 
of people depend on constitutional litigation as a means of social 
mobility and change.198 As such, the indigent population position 
within the justice system stands to be further minimized by this new 
panel. 
The history of the Legal Services Program (“LSP”) in the 1960s 
and 1970s proves just how powerful a weapon constitutional litigation 
can be for the poor. The LSP litigated hundreds of claims in front of 
the Supreme Court during that time—with most being constitutional 
 
 194. See Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
303, 304 (1988) (“Legal resources can affect legal outcomes in several ways. Those with 
more legal resources will often win at trial because the quality and quantity of legal 
assistance makes a difference to the persuasiveness of a case, be it through superior 
investigative work, specialization of legal talent, better law libraries, or simply because 
attorneys can devote more time to preparation.”). 
 195. Issachar Rosen-Zui, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 720 (2010). 
 196. Austin Sarat, “ . . . The Law is All Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal 
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344 (1990) (“The legal 
consciousness of the welfare poor is, I will argue, substantially different from other groups 
in society for whom law is a less immediate and visible presence.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. This reality is also shown by the NAACP and their usage of the three-judge courts 
in the 1950s and 1960s. See Johnston, supra note 74, at 213–14 (describing the use of a 
three-judge court in 1950s cases challenging the constitutionality of segregated schools). 
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claims.199 In doing so, these lawyers were able to alleviate the financial 
barriers to access to justice.200 But the three-judge court will dull the 
sharp blade of constitutional litigation for the poor by seriously 
depleting the resources of those programs that provide services to 
these populations.  
In 2012, now-retired Supreme Court of North Carolina Chief 
Justice Sarah Parker reported that there was one lawyer for every 554 
people in North Carolina and one legal services attorney to represent 
every 19,160 of the state’s poor.201 Moreover, the same report 
revealed that legal aid offices were forced to turn away almost eighty 
percent of qualified clients.202 Thus, even for “legal problems affecting 
basic human needs” there are not enough attorneys.203 Given the 
limited resources, programs that provide these services will be hard 
pressed to muster the kind of diverse constitutional litigation that 
made the LSP so successful because their limited resources may 
relegate them to triage work rather than filing constitutional 
litigation.204 
This shortage of resources will only increase because of the cost 
effects of the three-judge court. The creation of the three-judge court 
increases the complexity of constitutional litigation across North 
 
 199. SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 
AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 59 (1990) (providing a chart listing the number 
of constitutional claims before the Supreme Court). 
 200. See id. at 68 (“[T]he LSP presented the Supreme Court with a heterogeneous 
collection of its clients’ problems. [Cases involved] transfer programs, the criminal justice 
system, shelter, personal well-being, legal procedures, financial relationships, [and] 
political rights.”). 
 201. Gene Nichol, Most of NC’s Poor Cannot Afford Legal Representation, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/10/26/3312112 
_an-ironic-f-in-access-to-equal.html?rh=1 (“N.C. Supreme Court Chief Justice Sarah 
Parker reported last year there is one lawyer in North Carolina for every 554 people and 
one legal services attorney for every 19,160 poor people.”). 
 202. Id. (“Heroic legal aid offices are forced to turn away up to 80 percent of qualifying 
clients because they don’t have the resources to serve them.”). As sobering as that statistic 
is, there are further plans to reduce the Legal Aid Budget. See North Carolina’s Legal Aid 
Funding Threatened by N.C. General Assembly Budget, LEGAL SERVS. OF S. PIEDMONT, 
http://www.lssp.org/north-carolinas-legal-aid-funding-threatened-by-n-c-general-assembly-
budget/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2015) (“The N.C. General Assembly budget in its current 
state includes devastating funding cuts for LSSP and the state’s two other legal aid 
providers, Legal Aid of North Carolina and Pisgah Legal Services.”). 
 203. LEGAL AID OF N.C., https://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/about/default.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2015). 
 204. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina’s existence 
depends entirely on private donations from concerned individuals, foundation grants, and 
bequests. See Join the ACLU, ACLU, https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/Join-/-
Support/support-donate.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
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Carolina.205 And added complexity comes with monetary costs—when 
“the complexity of law and procedure increase, the total cost of 
resolving a matter goes up.”206 As noted above, the appellate process 
as written is unbalanced and can be exceedingly convoluted where an 
action presents claims other than a constitutional challenge.207 This 
complexity will likely increase costs for litigants across the state. As 
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of North Carolina Legal 
Foundation Director Christopher Brook describes it, 
The state has resources at its disposal to defend challenged 
provisions. An individual often does not. The state often has 
experience defending the constitutionality of provisions. Very 
few other attorneys in the state do constitutional work. These 
measures tip the balance even more in favor of the state by 
making it more costly to challenge provisions. These costs are 
not borne equally by the parties and the state can now arrive at 
the conclusion of litigation more quickly than the party 
challenging the provision.208 
Thus, combining the inherently limited resources of the indigent with 
an increase in cost to bring constitutional challenges will exacerbate 
an age-old dilemma for many legal service providers: they can 
represent everyone they possibly can, or they can save resources and 
only take the strongest cases that they think they will win despite the 
unfair playing field the law creates. The former expends resources, 
and the latter reduces access to the courts. Either consequence may 
be exacerbated by this law, further marginalizing the poor and 
powerless in North Carolina. 
B. Political Implications and the Harm to the Integrity of the 
Judiciary 
The effect that this law will have on litigants and judges is not 
limited to tangible cost increases and growing caseloads. The new law 
stands to harm the legitimacy of the court both in the eyes of the 
public and through political pressures that will be placed on those 
judges chosen to sit on panels. 
 
 205. See infra Section IV.A. 
 206. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the 
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV 953, 965 (2000). 
 207. See supra Section IV.A.1.a. 
 208. E-mail from Christopher Brook, Dir., ACLU of N.C. Legal Found., to author 
(Nov. 16, 2014, 07:50 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
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1.  Lowering The Public’s Estimation of the Court 
Scholars have argued that “the effectiveness of the judicial 
system is dependent on its perceived legitimacy.”209 This concept of 
“perceived legitimacy” rests in many ways on the public’s perception 
that the legal system is fair and effective.210 In the criminal law 
context, the legitimacy of police action and the moral credibility of 
the law are said to “strengthen social norms and increase compliance” 
because if the law is perceived as fair it is worth being followed.211 
These reflections can shed light on the events in North Carolina. The 
three-judge court statute threatens to reduce public trust in the 
fairness of the judiciary. 
The panel system will undermine the “perceived legitimacy” of 
the judicial system because the mechanics of the law adversely affect 
those challenging constitutional measures.212 Creating a mountain for 
one side to climb, while providing a path of ease for the other, raises 
basic questions of fairness.213 As described by the North Carolina Bar 
Association’s former president, Catharine Arrowood, the panel 
“doesn’t seem like it has the right ring of fairness.”214 Law is a public 
good, especially constitutional law, because it affects not only the 
 
 209. See Montre D. Carodine, Street Cred, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1583, 1592 (2013); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in 
Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 183 (2009) (“[C]ordoning off police decisions from public 
scrutiny encourages public distrust of the police. As a number of studies of public attitudes 
toward policing have shown, trust is much more effective as a foundation for public 
compliance with the law than the threat of punishment or reliance upon personal 
morality.”); see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57–60 (1990) (studying 
the effects of people’s judgments about the outcome favorability, distributive fairness, and 
procedural fairness of their recent personal experiences in small claims court on their 
attitudes about the legitimacy of legal authorities). 
 210. Carodine, supra note 208, at 1591 (arguing that “the value of the public’s trust to 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the legal system” should never be dismissed); see also 
Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2058–69 (1993) 
(arguing that due to insurmountable obstacles to litigation standing in the way of the less 
affluent, the current system of civil justice fails to deter public and private actors from 
engaging in wrongdoings). 
 211. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2005). 
 212. Recall the bifurcated appeals process the law implements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 7A-27(a1) (2014). This uneven appeals process runs afoul of notions of procedural 
justice. Procedural justice can “affect how litigants react to decisions and how the public 
views the legitimacy of the judiciary.” Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of 
the Judiciary, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1951, 1956 (2013). 
 213. See Jarvis, supra note 9 (“A requirement that appeals go directly to the Supreme 
Court undermines the current system in which the appellate court filters out most of the 
cases so that only the most important ones end up on the highest court’s docket . . . . [o]nly 
a limited number of cases can be heard . . . and that restricts citizens’ right to appeal.”). 
 214. Id. 
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litigants of a case but also all persons across the state.215 Thus, if a 
system the public relies on to be equitable and fair hampers or 
prevents efficient resolution of constitutional issues, the effectiveness 
of the judicial system is impaired by reduced public trust. 
Moreover, the inner workings of the law cannot be considered in 
isolation from the political context in which the law was implemented. 
In the past few years, North Carolina has experienced political 
turnover that has not come without unrest.216 The “Moral Monday” 
demonstrations have seen over 700 people arrested as a result of 
protests over Republican legislative policy since last year,217 and 
political tension remains at fever pitch.218 The majority of these 
policies, such as new voter identification laws or the refusal to expand 
Medicaid, have particularly strained the indigent population of the 
state.219 Situated within this context, it is easy to see how the general 
assembly’s three-judge court law could further strain the relationship 
between the government and the governed. If the three-judge court is 
perceived to be a wall meant to insulate the general assembly’s 
decision making, it could irreparably harm North Carolina’s view of 
the justice system. Whatever the general assembly’s intentions, what 
matters is perception, as any perception of the court system’s 
illegitimacy damages its utility.220 By infusing the foul odor of politics 
into the most apolitical branch of government, the three-judge court, 
especially in the existing political climate, will create a credibility gap 
between the government and the people who use the system to hold 
their government accountable. 
 
 215. See Rosen-Zui, supra note 194, at 720 (“[S]ince law is a public good, a suit that 
ends in a judicial resolution often not only serves the litigants at hand but also spills over 
to many other parties.”). 
 216. See Richard Fausset, With State Control, North Carolina Republicans Pursue 
Smaller Prizes, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/us/with-
state-control-north-carolina-republicans-pursue-smaller-prizes.html?_r=0 (noting that 
Republicans control the North Carolina General Assembly for the first time since 
Reconstruction). 
 217. Editorial, The Decline of North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/the-decline-of-north-carolina.html?_r=0. 
 218. See id. (“But the bad news keeps on coming from the Legislature, and pretty soon 
a single day of the week may not be enough to contain the outrage.”). 
 219. See id. (“[S]tate government has become a demolition derby, tearing down years 
of progress in public education, tax policy, racial equality in the courtroom and access to 
the ballot.”). 
 220. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic 
Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1998) (arguing 
that the preservation of democracy depends upon not only the independence of judges but 
also the public’s perception—and therefore trust—that judges are independent).  
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2.  Harm to the Independence of the Judiciary 
Not only will the mechanisms implemented by the three-judge 
court harm the legitimacy of the court, but the mandate that the chief 
justice of the supreme court choose the members of the panels is also 
cause for concern. North Carolina is among the states whose 
constitutions require election of all judges.221 These elections are 
comprised of non-partisan primaries, a method thought to maximize 
the power of the state’s voters in the decision-making process.222 
Though there is considerable debate as to the virtues and vices of 
such a system,223 the new legislation’s call to have an elected chief 
justice select the members of each panel will undermine public 
confidence and unfortunately project an image of a system infested 
with political bias.224 
To be fair, the law does claim to “ensure fairness, to avoid the 
appearance of impropriety, and to avoid political bias” by diversifying 
the membership of each panel, and it prevents any former member of 
the general assembly from serving on a panel.225 However, there 
remain real questions as to the methodology that the chief justice will 
employ in choosing the panels. Granted, the law mandates that a 
judge come from three predetermined locations in the state, but the 
chief justice has no other parameters inside which his or her choices 
 
 221. See Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding of Judicial Campaigns: The North 
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 222. See id. In 1996, the general assembly enacted legislation to ensure that superior 
court judges were elected in the same non-partisan primaries. See Act of Aug. 2, 1996, 
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Park, Judicial Elections: The Case For Accountability, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 
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judiciary. Second, and more mundane but no less important, the impartial administration 
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complete trust in the judicial system. Only sixty-eight percent of those polled agreed that 
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court did let personal or political views influence how they 
decided cases. See Americans’ Views on the Issues, N.Y. TIMES. (June 6, 2013), 
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 225. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 26A-1-267.1(b) (2013). 
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will be fenced.226 This is not to say that the chief justice should not be 
trusted to make this decision, but he or she should not be placed in 
such a predicament. The chief justice will be placed into a partisan 
position by virtue of having to make a choice. 
Whatever pressure the new law places on the chief justice will be 
felt tenfold by the members of the presiding panels. A study of 
federal three-judge courts showed that judges on these panels handle 
cases differently than they do individually.227 Of particular relevance, 
these studies have found that federal judges do, at least implicitly, 
decide cases with the hope for unanimous decisions.228 In basic terms, 
it means that a Republican judge is more willing to side with two 
Democratic judges on an issue that they might usually be opposed to, 
for instance affirmative action.229 Thus, such studies prove that the 
political orientation of two judges can be an accurate predictor of how 
a panel will decide a case.230 Indeed, this can cut either way for a party 
trying to challenge a law depending on the members of the panel. So 
while the results can perhaps be favorable to a given party, these so-
called “panel effects” are ugly truths of empanelled judges insofar as 
a judge’s political orientation plays a larger role in decision making 
than it should.231 
No such study has been conducted for North Carolina courts, but 
language in one redistricting case can substitute for the lack of 
empirical evidence. In 2013, a three-judge court convened to hear the 
initial challenge to new voting maps drawn by the general assembly.232 
The opinion’s introduction squarely addressed the political concerns 
 
 226. Id. § 1-267.1(b) (2014)). 
 227. Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels Affect Judges: Evidence From United States District 
Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1235 (2005). 
 228. Id. at 1263. 
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 231. Id. 
 232. Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11 CVS 16896, 2013 WL 3376658, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
July 8, 2013), aff’d Dickson v. Rucho, 367 N.C.542, 746 S.E.2d 238 (2014), vacated and 
remanded by Dickson v. Rucho, 135 S. Ct. 1843 (2015) (remanding in light of Ala. Legis. 
Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015)). Later in 2014, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina upheld the ruling of the three-judge court and found the voting 
maps constitutional. See Colleen Jenkins, North Carolina Judges Uphold GOP-Drawn 
Voting Districts, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-
usa-north-carolina-redistricting-idUSKBN0JX2DC20141219. 
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that have been discussed in this Comment.233 The court acknowledged 
the political importance of its decision, but was careful to cover its 
own tracks: 
This decision was reached unanimously by the trial court. In 
other words, each of the three judges on the trial court—
appointed by the North Carolina Chief Justice from different 
geographic regions and each with differing ideological and 
political outlooks—independently and collectively arrived at 
the conclusions that are set out below.234 
Notably, the language expressed by the judges seems to be a 
collective note asking for understanding from the reader; one can feel 
the tension in the passage. Thus, if anything, this admission by the 
court suggests that three-judge courts put these judges in a tough 
spot. This is not to say that arriving at a constitutional decision alone 
is easy, but the effects of the panels on the political psyches of judges 
are sure to make their jobs more difficult than is necessary. 
A past president of the American Bar Association, Jerome 
Shestack, once said that “what marks our nation from so many 
unstable or authoritarian governments is, to a substantial measure, 
the independence of our judges as preservers of our constitutional 
rights.”235 Though referring to the federal judiciary, whose members 
are appointed for life, Shestack’s words have some salience in the 
present context. North Carolina’s judges are not appointed for life, so 
they are not free from, at least in the abstract, political and outside 
pressures to decide cases in a wholly impartial manner. Forcing the 
chief justice to choose and the superior court judges to decide as a 
panel will dilute much needed judicial independence in North 
Carolina’s courts. 
The use of a three-judge court to hear constitutional challenges 
will harm the judiciary and the citizens who depend on it to 
function.236 Inside the judicial chambers, it forces judges to confront 
the political ramifications of their decisions and possibly even change 
their votes according to the pressure such a choice will bring.237 No 
legislation can be worthwhile if it operates despite these unfortunate 
consequences. Outside the halls of the courtroom, the politicization of 
 
 233. See supra Section IV.B. 
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the three-judge court legislation will sap the trust of the court system 
from the state’s citizens. Both implications damage the integrity of an 
institution that is worth preserving. 
C. A Step in the Right Direction 
A critique without a solution adds little value to a discussion. 
Thus, to conclude, this Comment will briefly recommend some 
suggestions that could possibly address some of the major concerns 
presented in this article. Of all of the issues surrounding the passage 
of this new legislation, of most concern is the unbalanced appellate 
process. Not only will it contribute to inefficiency in terms of 
prolonged litigation and wasted time, but it projects an image of 
unfairness that will taint the judicial system as a whole.238 The 
following proposed language to General Statute § 7A-27239 seeks to 
address these concerns. 
Appeal as a right lies directly to the Supreme Court from any 
order or judgment of a court, either final or interlocutory that is 
brought pursuant to G.S. 1-267.1 that holds an act of the 
General Assembly is facially invalid or valid on the basis that 
the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law. 
This subsection shall apply where the State, a political 
subdivision of the state, or any other litigant is a party in the 
civil action brought before a three-judge court. 
Though this proposed language still mandates that each appeal be 
heard directly by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, it does not 
differentiate between parties bringing the appeal. Balancing the 
appeals process could go a long way toward ameliorating some of the 
concerns mentioned throughout this section. This proposed solution 
does not eliminate the effects of panels on judges’ decision making or 
the increased burden on the high court. But this proposal ensures that 
every litigant enjoys the same treatment under the law. Thus, despite 
the ambiguity in the law and the effect it will have on the judiciary, 
this change at least addresses the important need of preserving the 
legitimacy of the court system. 
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law. 
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CONCLUSION 
A zoning dispute out of Boone, North Carolina marks the 
beginning of a new era of constitutional litigation in the state.240 
Debate about the use of a three-judge court to hear these cases is sure 
to escalate as each new challenge makes its way to Raleigh to be 
heard. Chief among the questions raised, however, must be the one 
posed at the outset of this Comment: Is this a good idea? This 
Comment has answered with a resounding no and argued that, at this 
new dawn of civil procedure, the North Carolina General Assembly 
should reconsider its choice. 
Though the law is likely constitutional, legal validity does not 
equal good policy. Its effects and its consequences must ultimately be 
the standard by which we measure the validity of a law. Therefore, a 
more holistic evaluation is necessary. This Comment has shown that 
the institutionalization of the three-judge court brings with it a litany 
of concerns ranging from the integrity of the judiciary to the lives of 
the state’s most vulnerable citizens. Such far-reaching consequences 
cannot be ignored, especially when the general assembly’s concern in 
passing this law is to stop venue shopping and guard against judicial 
activism. These concerns may be valid, but in this case the means do 
not justify the ends. We have been here before; the history of the 
federal courts tells us what will happen. 
Stereoscopic sight allows the human eye to combine two images, 
affording us the ability to see with greater depth and breadth than 
each eye could see on its own. With one eye on the potential effects 
that this law will have and the other on the lessons of the past, this 
Comment is a first effort to peer into the ramifications of this new 
legislation. Though the future is unclear, the people of North 
Carolina and the general assembly should not hold their breath 
waiting for positive change from this law. 
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